The brutality of Russia's war against Chechen secessionists has stirred little outrage in the West. Yet the Chechens show no signs of abandoning their struggle. They may well be counting on a U.S. rapprochement with Iran -- a move that PNS editor Franz Schurmann argues is no more unthinkable than Nixon's sudden opening with China in 1971. Schurmann is author of numerous books on foreign affairs and a professor emeritus of history and sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

Unlike Bosnia, the Russo-Chechen war has stirred little outcry from the global community, despite the fact that Russian firepower alone has already killed one-tenth of Chechnya's 790,000 people. Writing recently in Le Monde, prominent Western intellectuals called the planetary silence over Chechnya scary.

Is there a role the U.S. could play to end one of the world's most brutal conflicts? Yes, but only if Washington acknowledges that much more is involved than a unionist-versus-secessionist war. The key move would be for the U.S. to end its demonization of Iran and achieve a rapprochement equivalent to Nixon's rapprochement with China.

To understand the impact this would have requires understanding that the rebels are fighting not so much for Chechen secession as for the independence of the entire Caucasus from Russia.

For 200 years, the Caucasus peoples -- over 50 different groups with their own language and ethnicity -- have been dominated by the Russian colossus. Indeed, ever since ancient times, they have faced surrounding empires seeking to capture their wealth. Survival has often hinged on their ability to play off one rival empire against the other. Early in the 1900s, that required outmaneuvering the Russian, Ottoman and the Persian empires. Today, the Russians remain, as do the Persians (now called Iranians). While the Ottoman empire is gone, it is rapidly being replaced by an American world order represented in the region by Turkey, U.S.-led NATO's vital southeastern anchor. The Muslim Chechens like to show their independence by closely identifying with an Islamic revolutionary tide rising throughout the Muslim world.

Chechen rebel leader Dzhokhar Dudayev knows full well that his best chances of prevailing lie in gaining the support of the other two empires -- Iran and the U.S. As of now those chances seem dim. Neither the Americans nor the Iranians want to antagonize the Russians. To both, the Chechens are small potatoes, an expendable people in the grand game of great national interests.

For the Russians, crushing the Chechens is vital to assuring their future destiny as a great power, a "derzhava" as they call it. It is key for reestablishing their control over the Caucasus and its oil resources, as well as those of the former Soviet Union which the U.S. also covets.

To help their derzhava strategy along, Moscow has chosen to collaborate with two of America's enemies, China and Iran. Russo-Iranian relations are growing ever closer while Russia recently announced it would redirect the bulk of its trade away from the West to East Asia, a sign of its improved ties with China. China is now Russia's best customer for arms, while Russia and China are Iran's chief arms supplier.

Meanwhile, Washington has demonized Iran as it once demonized "Red China" in the 1950s. Iran is viewed as an arch enemy of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the main threat to U.S. domination of Gulf oil. At the same time, eager to help Yelstin stay in power, Washington has said virtually nothing about the genocide going on in Chechnya.

Given these circumstances, why would Dudayev assume that there is even the remotest chance Washington would do the unthinkable -- make a dramatic offer to Iran as Nixon did to China in 1971?

One reason is the growing talk by Republicans that the cause of pro-Western Russian reform is already lost. Even if Yeltsin should win in the June election, they argue, his government has moved so far away from the West that the U.S. must ultimately write off Russia as an ally. The frequent discrepancies between White House and State Department statements on Russia suggest that U.S. policy makers are readying themselves for finally throwing in the Russia card.

Should that happen, the U.S. could suddenly face the return of an old trouble-maker for its Middle Eastern, Balkan and oil policies: Russia. The most logical step to counter the Russian threat would be to seek a rapprochement with Iran, much as National Security Council director Robert McFarlane hoped to do when he flew to Teheran in the mid-1980s.

The chances are good that Iran would respond positively. Moscow, faced with the prospect of America and Iran coming together, would then have no choice but to seriously consider Dudayev's terms. If they didn't, the Chechen rebellion could spread all over the Caucasus, inviting support from both Iran and the U.S.

The best peace scenario, of course, is that both all the world's empires realize they have nothing to gain and everything to lose from pursuing 19th century Kiplingesque rivalries. Barring that, the very prospect of Washington coming to terms with Teheran might be all that Yeltsin needs to jettison an extremely unpopular war at home.