Even as the Taiwan crisis recedes the potential for a Cold War II is growing in East Asia pitting the U.S. and Japan against China. The catalyst could well be President Clinton's forthcoming trip to Japan where he will seek a major enlargement of the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty. PNS editor Franz Schurmann, author of The Logic of World Power and numerous other books on foreign affairs, is a professor emeritus of history and sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

The Taiwan crisis is easing but a larger power rivalry is taking shape in East Asia. By the time President Clinton returns from Japan next month, a Cold War II could be underway pitting the U.S. and Japan against China.

The U.S. and Japan have long been discussing a major enlargement of their 1951 Mutual Security Treaty in which Japan would commit itself to the defense of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Despite widespread opposition in Japan, the odds are strong that the new alliance will soon be proclaimed with China as its chief target.

When Cold War I began in the late 1940s the U.S. and Britain led a NATO coalition polarized against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. But Cold War II is going to be much more complex. The U.S. and Japan will still be rivals even as they get together to "contain" China. And both will be actively trading with China as they mount a joint defense against it.

Like Cold War I, Cold War II is not supposed to lead to a shooting war. But as earlier, each participant will want to gain victory. And victory means radically cutting down the power of the other two contenders.

Of the three the U.S. has the greatest power stakes in the region and therefore the most to lose. In 1945 the U.S. won huge stakes when it smashed Japan. China remained powerless while a weakened Russia could barely hold on to the territory it snatched from Japan in the final days of World War II.

Today U.S. power is symbolized by the mighty Seventh Fleet whose military range extends from San Diego across the Pacific and Indian oceans to Mombasa in Kenya. But that power also now faces the first serious threat in East Asia since 1945. China is richer, more powerful and more confident than it has been in the last two centuries. In U.S. and Japanese strategic circles talk now focuses on the "China threat."

The U.S. also sees a threat from Japan. Not only is Japan richer than the U.S. and technologically as powerful, but Tokyo is also gaining self-confidence the way it did a century ago. Then it defeated China in 1895, followed by Russia in 1905, having already forced the proud British to accept an alliance with it in 1902. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto clearly hopes to repeat that feat with Clinton.

Thanks to these changed power relationships, both the Chinese and the Japanese now find themselves at the gaming table with far bigger stakes than in earlier decades. The U.S., on the other hand, has experienced a net loss -- a condition that neither American politicians nor military are prepared to accept.

A new Cold War II ideology is also arising in both countries. Ever since Cold War I ended a dogma has gained credence in the West that "democracies don't go to war with each other." The subtext -- heightened by powerful human rights lobbies -- is that democracies like Japan and the U.S. inevitably must form alliances against non-democratic foes like China.

This ideology has helped steer public opinion in both countries towards a pro- Taiwan stance. In the U.S. the Taiwan crisis has reinforced support for the new anti-China stance that now spans the political spectrum from the Jerry Brown left to the Jesse Helms right. The same phenomenon is evident in Japan where widespread pro-Taiwan sentiment is also gaining support from left to right.

But the iron fist is evident in the velvet glove. Japan's noted expert on China Mineo Nakashima hails the U.S.-Japan democratic alliance but also warns that security for Asian nations can only come if China breaks into pieces. He then ups the ante by calling for Japan to "assume leadership of Asian nations and not remain silent" in the face of Chinese provocations.

Japanese and American public opinion, while fearful and critical of China, show no sign of supporting a Cold War II. Hashimoto has repeatedly assured China that he is not hostile and majorities in the U.S. Congress, while supporting Taiwan and condemning China, have shied away from any confrontation.

For all three peoples booming economies are more important than power rivalries. But the power brokers on all three sides are trying to find ways to get Cold War II going and still trade at the same time.

The consequences are only too clear: more nerve-wrenching crises with the danger that one could get out of hand the moment one of the participants fears his stakes are about to vanish.