Some U.S. observers view Mexico's increasingly close military and political ties with Washington as a sign of its commitment to institute the rule of law over and above the rule of narco-politicians and drug lords. But Mexico's military -- in line for major U.S. aid -- is among its most corrupt institutions. And the cross-border initiatives have not been matched by domestic reforms. PNS associate editor Andrew Reding directs the North America Project of the World Policy Institute at The New School for Social Research, where he is also Senior Fellow for Hemispheric Affairs.

A sea-change is underway in U.S.-Mexico relations, marked by unprecedented military and political ties. While Washington hails this as a sign of Mexico's growing respect for the rule of law, it could instead presage a further slide toward corruption, turmoil and ungovernability.

In a dramatic abandonment of Mexico's bristly nationalism towards the U.S., President Zedillo delivered a well known drug trafficker, Juan Garcia Abrego, to the FBI in January. Now he's preparing to extradite two more Mexican citizens wanted for crimes committed in the U.S. More significant, the Mexican army --which long viewed the U.S. as the primary threat to Mexico's security -- has begun to accept training and equipment from the Pentagon.

But these cross-border initiatives are not being matched by meaningful domestic reforms. Fearing a breakup of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Zedillo has been unwilling to challenge corrupt party power-brokers, many of whom helped him reach the presidency in the first place. Confronted with circumstantial evidence suggesting involvement of former cabinet members in the assassinations of a cardinal, a presidential candidate, and the speaker-elect of the Chamber of Deputies, Zedillo has looked the other way. While reassuring the party establishment that he will honor the unwritten rule that bars prosecution of high officials, he has made a mockery of his inaugural pledge to create "a nation of law."

That not only spells impunity for PRI bosses, but for the narcotics empires many of them are protecting. The Arrellano Felix brothers, who allegedly head the Tijuana Cartel and are wanted for the assassination of Cardinal Juan Posadas in Guadalajara three years ago, continue to appear in public in Tijuana without fear of arrest. It is also common knowledge that most of the federal police commanders in northern Mexico are on the payrolls of drug traffickers.

Unable or unwilling to reform the police, Zedillo has turned to the army to spearhead anti-narcotics efforts. Hailing this as a sign the Mexican government is "getting tough" on drugs, the U.S. government is chipping in with a major expansion of military assistance. Twenty UH-1H Huey helicopters are being turned over to the Mexican Air Force; another 50 or so helicopters will be provided next year; and Mexican soldiers and pilots will be trained at U.S. bases.

The armed forces, however, are among the most corrupt of Mexican institutions and -- not coincidentally -- almost entirely exempt from civilian review. In November 1991, Mexican troops at Tlalixcoyan, Veracruz, slaughtered federal anti-narcotics agents who landed at an airstrip in hot pursuit of Colombian cocaine traffickers. The army, it turns out, was preparing to refuel the traffickers' plane. Though the general on the scene was eventually imprisoned, his superiors escaped scrutiny, again because of an unwritten rule that prevents prosecution of members of the military high command.

In 1992, Brigadier General Francisco Gallardo tried to challenge such impunity by proposing the appointment of a human rights and anti-corruption ombudsman in the armed forces. He was rewarded by being thrown in the brig. Despite a series of court decisions ordering his release, he remains a prisoner today. The case is now before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington.

Whatever the outcome, President Zedillo's unwillingness to assert his constitutional authority to uphold the law raises troubling questions about the extent to which the Mexican army is subject to civil authority. Taking advantage of the president's political weakness, the army earlier prevailed on Zedillo to pursue a military solution to the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas. Will the Mexican military, which felt humiliated by the early political success of the rebellion, now use U.S. helicopters to strike a final blow in Chiapas? Or, in the ultimate of ironies, will it use the helicopters to help transport narcotics to the U.S. border?

Until the army is made accountable to the public and the rule of law, anything is possible -- and even likely.