Foreign policy analysts are scrutinizing the names of delegates chosen to participate in Vietnam's upcoming Eighth National Congress for clues as to what course the country will take for the next century. But as conservatives keep tussling with reformers over control versus economics, Vietnam's root problem may be irresolvable. PNS commentator Thi Lam, a former general in the South Vietnamese army, is the author of "Autopsy: The Death of South Vietnam" (1985).

SAN JOSE -- Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are abuzz with the guessing game of who will emerge as Vietnam's new leaders following the Communist Party's Eighth National Congress in late June. But with the country at a dangerous crossroads, far more is at stake in this selection process than personalities.

At the Sixth National Congress in 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party adopted the "Doi Moi" (Change) policy of opening up to foreign investments and encouraging privatization. A decade of free market reforms has put thousands of shops and factories into private hands but also brought along with it the "social evils of capitalism" -- corruption, crime, drugs and prostitution.

More importantly, economic reforms have seriously eroded the Party's authority. Conservative party leaders now realize that the authority of the party varies in inverse proportion to the success of "Doi Moi" and that to preserve the party, they will have to put a stop to market economics and revert back to the old communist system of central planning.

As conservatives vie with reformers, a deep rift has opened within the top hierarchy of the VCP. The conservative wing seemed to have the upper hand when two hard-line members of the Politburo -- Dao duy Tung and Nguyen ha Phan -- were chosen by the Central Committee to prepare the draft political report for the Party Congress. The political report, completed in April, calls for a significant increase in the role of the state sector by the year 2020.

In January, the conservatives scored a point when General Dao dinh Luyen, a strong supporter of reform, was demoted and replaced by conservative General Le Khai Phieu. At the same time, the government launched a noisy campaign to wipe out the so-called "Social and Cultural Evils" in Vietnamese cities. Karaoke parlors were closed. Bars were raided and Vietnamese women arrested for fraternizing with foreigners. Advertisements in foreign languages were removed. An atmosphere of xenophobia seemed to overtake the country.

But recent developments suggest that the "reformists", under Prime Minister Vo van Kiet, have mounted a counter-attack. In April, the Nguyen ha Phan -- co-author of the draft political report -- was expelled from the Party and placed under house arrest for allegedly having revealed information to South Vietnamese security forces while under arrest in the 1960s.

In May, two pro-reform party members were selected as party secretaries in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi to replace the incumbent party secretaries, who were generally viewed as politically conservative. Since the leaders of these two cities normally join the Politburo, the reformist wing appears to have staged a last minute come-back.

The stakes in this tug of war are huge. On the one hand, the push for economic reforms is bound to open Vietnam up to a dangerously subversive flow of information from the outside world through FAX machines, the Internet and other high-tech media that are beyond the government's control. It also would create an increasingly important middle class which would demand a stronger say in government affairs.

On the other hand, a return to the old economic system would have a disastrous impact on the economy with incalculable consequences for the regime.

No matter which side gains the upper hand, Vietnam's root problem will be insoluble as long as it remains communist. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security chief under the Carter administration, put it best when he defined the irresolvable contradiction of communist systems as one where economic success can be purchased only at the cost of political stability, while political stability can be sustained only at the cost of economic failure.

The Eighth Party Congress may temporarily patch up ideological rifts within the party and maintain a semblance of status quo. But in the long run, the Vietnamese communist regime, like its counterparts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, will ultimately fall victim to its antiquated system, its inherent inflexibility, its resistance to political reforms, its inability to adapt to changing times.