CIVIL CONFLICTS

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Reversal of Fortune in Serbia -- Five Reasons to Hope

By Eric D. Gordy

Date: 12-04-96

Has the ghost of democracy finally come alive in Serbia? After two weeks of anti-government demonstrations, it is difficult to predict the future and the popular uprisings of the past offer little reason for hope. But crucial changes have occurred over the last five years which may have shifted the advantage away from President Slobodan Milosevic to the street. PNS commentator Eric D. Gordy, a sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley, who specializes in the former Yugoslavia, lived in Belgrade for much of the last five years.

This time, democracy may finally come to life in Serbia.

Five years ago, massive anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade fizzled out before they achieved any concrete results. That's not about to happen this time round as the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic enters its third week of escalating popular protests. With or without a crackdown by the military and police, key facts have changed that may have shifted the advantage to the street.

*The opposition has finally got it "Together". For the first time, the "Zajedno" ("Together") coalition won majorities in every major city in Serbia. It includes -- as members or sympathizers -- every major party except Milosevic's ultra-right Serbian Radical Party, with the largest independent trade union thrown in for good measure.

By putting aside the rivalries which have discredited it in the recent past, the Serbian opposition can now present itself as a democratic alternative. More importantly, it is the collective victim of a single massive and obvious move: the regime nullified the elections of Nov. 17th. This allows it to channel the frustrations of the large portion of the population who are reluctant to support any party, but nonetheless resent the regime's illegal behavior.

*The nationalist card is spent. Milosevic was once able to neutralize workers by calling their attention to Serbian nationalist programs which claimed to articulate their pride and protect their interests. But defeat in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have brought isolation and refugees rather than pride. They have also brought sanctions, 50 percent unemployment, and wages well below minimum subsistence. As a result, Nenad Stefanovit writes in Serbia's still-uncensored weekly Vreme, "Serbian workers are taking to the streets more as workers, and less as Serbians."

*Belgrade is no longer alone. The 1991 and 1992 protests were limited to the city of Belgrade, where Milosevic and his regime have always been unpopular. But with the opposition "Zajedno" coalition denied its victory after winning in every major city, there are protests in every city.

*Milosevic can no longer count on the army and police. In 1991, the Army commanders were easily persuaded that a threat to Yugoslavia was at hand, and brought the protests to a dramatic end. Since then the Army has been shaken by dishonorable withdrawals from and by repeated purges of its officer corps. Today's military is made up principally of those unwilling recruits who could not find a way to escape military service. Their loyalty to the regime is far from secure.

The massively expanded police forces draw heavily on refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their families have also been victims of the war, and are likely to resent Milosevic's failure to make good on his promise to protect them. The older corps of professional police feel that, by politicizing the police forces the regime has prevented them from carrying out their work.

*The regime has not supported its supporters. Pensioners and unskilled workers, among the strongest backers of the regime in past elections, have seen their living standard fall dramatically, and many are now expanding the base of protest.

*Milosevic cannot claim legitimacy this time. State-run media could disqualify previous protests by claiming they were directed against a legally-elected government, however fraudulent those elections may have been. But this time it is the regime that is opposing the results of an election. Now there is reason for even conformists to be outraged.

It is impossible to predict the effects of the protests in Serbia. But these demonstrations, the largest and most important Serbia has seen to date, reveal that the regime's vindictiveness in defeat has exposed its weakness. It cannot recapture its strength.