Even if Dennis Ross has succeeded in convincing Yasser Arafat of the need to curb Palestinian terror against Israelis, his mission has only deepened the rut in which the peace making process is stuck, argues Arab commentator Rami Khouri. Writing from Washington rather than his home base of Amman, Jordan, what strikes Khouri is the relative nonchalance with which the U.S. now views the troubling triad of hard-line rhetoric, violence and ineffectual diplomacy.

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The idea that U.S. mediation via Dennis Ross & Co. can or will make a significant breakthrough in the troubled Israeli-Palestinian peace-making process strikes many Arabs like myself as illusory, if not absurd. This impression is confirmed by a visit to Washington where it is quickly clear that the whole process has become almost peripheral to American (and Western) strategic interests.

Well before the current crisis, which began with the July 30 Jerusalem bombings, the Middle East, and the long-standing preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli conflict, no longer seemed as vital to American (and Western) strategic interests as it was a decade or two ago. Bill Clinton's orchestration of the Sharm esh-Sheikh photo-op summit on terrorism last year sent a clear message -- from now on the Middle East gets symbolic, rather than substantive, attention from the world's powers.

Indeed, in the 13 months since the Netanyahu government took office, there has been a direct and unavoidable relationship among three recurring events: heightened hard-line rhetoric and actions by the Israeli government on key issues like Jewish settlements and Jerusalem; acts of violence against Israelis by Palestinians and other Arabs; and diplomatic shuttles by Dennis Ross. We would do well to understand the meaning of this troubling triad and address its causes rather than merely perpetuating it.

The U.S. today views the harsh tone and provocative policies of the Netanyahu government as new realities that must be accommodated in the diplomatic equation. This is the obvious conclusion derived from analyzing U.S. government actions and policies.

It is also clear that, from an American perspective, the status quo in the Middle East, with its bombs and tensions, is more annoying than threatening. All that is required is a more sustained -- but not much deeper or more meaningful -- version of last year's Sharm esh-Sheikh spectacle.

So we in the Middle East get Dennis Ross, with the promise of a possible personal appearance by the one and only Madeline Albright if things go well. This is not a sign that Americans think the Arab-Israeli situation is grave; it is a sign of American nonchalance, which in turn accurately reflects the low priority that the Arab-Israeli question has in American and most Western calculations of national interest.

The Oslo peace process will almost certainly be revived, but it is unlikely to move much further if its inherent pro-Israeli imbalance remains intact. The chief imbalance -- manifested yet again during this latest crisis -- is that the Oslo agreement holds Palestinian national rights hostage to the prior achievement of Israeli rights, mainly rights to recognition and security.

Given the Netanyahu government's hard-line policies and the US government's nonchalance, it is not surprising that non-Arabs have interpreted the Oslo process primarily as a means of assuring Israel's political and economic acceptance in the region and its physical security. These are reasonable and logical goals, but they cannot be the sole or prerequisite goals in the process, leaving the achievement of Palestinian national rights and other Arab states' rights as a mere accessory to Israel's national rights.

If the Israeli-Palestinian talks go directly to the final status issues, as the United States has suggested, this will magnify rather than overcome this fundamental imbalance. If the parties do not quickly redress the imbalances, the current cycle of extremism, stalemate and violence will inevitably transform itself again into prolonged warfare. The bombs in Israel will increase, not decrease.

Those who continue to bomb Israeli civilians do so more out of a sense of deep indignity and despair than out of any inherent desire to kill Israelis or Jews. Many in Israel and the United States would like to keep the peace-making discussions focused on the question of Arab terror and Israeli security. Those are important issues -- but so are those of Palestinian national rights, the status of Palestinian refugees, the sovereign territorial rights of Syria and Lebanon, and other such issues.

The Oslo process was initially launched because both sides saw it as a chance to realize meaningful national gains in return for significant concessions to the other side. The process has stalled because the symmetry of diplomatic benefits has ended, and the balance sheet of priority actions has shifted towards the Israeli side.

Would-be mediators who aspire to more than diplomatic theater should focus on achieving balanced, simultaneous gains for both sides, rather than rushing to respond to the concerns of only one side. This is the difference between a peace process designed to achieve lasting and fair peace, and a television spectacle designed to make you feel good for a few moments. In Washington, the difference is often hard to spot.