For a decade China and India have been steadily improving ties, despite an undercurrent of tension marked by weapons tests and exchanges. India's nuclear tests now threaten to end that friendship as each side seeks to shore up its power position in South Asia. PNS commentator Sanjoy Banerjee, a specialist on South Asia, teaches political science at the Institute for International Relations at San Francisco State University.

India's nuclear tests set off a new war of words with China, with prime minister Vajpayee openly naming China as a major reason for the testing and the Chinese accusing India of seeking "hegemony" in South Asia. These angry words could mark the collapse of a decade of improving ties -- and the beginning of a new tragedy as the two titans jockey for power in South Asia.

Bilateral relations started to improve with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988. A year later, however, India tested a medium-range missile capable of hitting Chinese targets. Despite India's disclaimer of any intention to produce the missile, the test underscored an ongoing tension between the two countries.

That same year, China began providing missile and nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan. The United States objected, but the process has continued, even as China and India moved to resolve border disputes and other problems.

In 1997, China's president Jiang Zemin went to Pakistan and urged that country to begin negotiations with India, putting the very difficult question of Kashmir on the back burner for the time being. This was a significant bow to India.

In 1998, Pakistan tested for the first time a missile capable of hitting most of India, called "ghauri." The United States imposed token sanctions on Pakistan, saying China was not involved -- though Indian officials called China the "mother of ghauri."

China's recent charges about India and hegemony may simply indicate that China thinks India is much better armed than Pakistan. If so, China may have acted to "correct" the situation.

India and China apparently hold radically different views about the appropriate trilateral relationship between India, China and Pakistan -- differences now brought into sharp focus.

India thinks it has the right to insist that the flow of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan should be restricted -- enabling India to maintain its edge over Pakistan.

China regards itself as operating on a higher plane, with the right to correct imbalances in South Asia without being viewed as a threat to India.

India understands that China may be ahead of India in nuclear technology -- but not so far ahead as to talk on a different level. India's nuclear testing -- particularly of a hydrogen bomb -- and the rhetoric that accompanied it seem designed to make these points to China.

India and China must come to some agreement on their legitimate, respective roles in the region. India recognizes that China, with 30 percent more people, has a GNP two and a half times that of India. China also conducted its first nuclear test before 1968, the cutoff date making it a nuclear power under the nonproliferation treaty. China has a veto on the UN Security Council.

At the same time, China knows that India has arrived near the front ranks of technology in several important areas, and is educating scientists and engineers more rapidly than China. If it is determined to do so, India can pose a major threat to China.

Yet very few people in India want to do that -- they do not view China as Pakistan views India. For its part China has little to lose in reconciling with India.

The danger lies in a single fact: while for India the cost of conflict with China would be very high, the cost of acquiescing to China's role as power broker in South Asia may well be even higher.