Although they may have had some payoff in terms of domestic politics for India's ruling coalition, the recent nuclear tests are widely seen as a sort of warning finger pointed at China. But an examination of China's actions over the last decade or so indicates that it sees India as insignificant, at least in terms of nuclear strategy. PNS commentator Batuk Vora writes for newspapers and magazines from New York to Hong Kong. He lives in Advadam, Gajurat, India.

India's nuclear tests have been described as a message to China.

But the fact is that India long ago ceased to matter in China's defense plans. It is time Indian politicians took note of this.

At a 1996 meeting of American, Chinese, European and Russian nuclear scientists in Sichuan, China, a Chinese participant revealed that country's last project to develop a medium-range ballistic missile (DF-25) has been canceled for lack of funds.

As China's economy is booming, the explanation could as well have been lack of interest. The fact that the 1700 kilometer DF-25 is considered irrelevant to China's current situation says a lot about China's collective mind and India's place in it.

China's current military strategy, according to both Western and Eastern analysts, is oriented to potential confrontation with the United States, over Central Asian or Mid Eastern oil-gas interests or on the perennial Taiwan issue. This is what the Chinese say in hushed tones, and what U.S. think-tanks speak of loud and clear.

The implication is that China no longer formulates its military plans with India in mind. Certainly, none of the Chinese nuclear scientists at the Sichuan meeting talked of India as an element in their nation's nuclear policy makers.

This was not the first indication of a shift, but a potent reminder of a change begun more than 10 years ago. A brief look at the history of China's missile programs leads to the inescapable conclusion that China should not be the basis of India's military planning -- or of its arms-control policy -- either.

How can India forget the nuclear related assistance it received from China? According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China supplied India with heavy water, low-enriched uranium and uranium enrichment services. It is also true that China has a good-sized arsenal of ballistic missiles and is developing more. China deployed its first missile capable of striking India in 1971, but India was not the target -- U.S. bases in the Philippines were. The Chinese focused on increasing missile range and improving their performance in the context of a war with Russia or the U.S. until 1985, when Deng Xiaoping gained approval for a program based on the assumption that China would not enter a major war for several decades.

These changes, combined with the economic and scientific reforms, altered the way Chinese military production units operate, and some engineers began to develop short-range missiles independently. These were comparable to India's Prithvi but more advanced, and may have been sold, wholly or in parts, to Iran, Pakistan and Syria.

China's highest priority was ensuring that missiles could strike western Russia or the United States to survive a pre-emptive attack. This program is seen by some observers as an insurance policy.

Other nuclear weapon states have also bought insurance in that sense, and India's nuclear option was maintained for much the same purpose. When the Chinese government dropped the DF-25, it reiterated its view that nuclear missile forces have no relevance to Sino-Indian relations and that India is not relevant to Chinese military planning.

According to SIPRI, the DF-3A, the missile that the DF-25 would have replaced, is obsolete, and no other Chinese missiles can reach major targets in India.

Furthermore, Japan's defense agency has confirmed that China's strategic nuclear bomber force has been de-activated after years of neglect that left Xian Aircraft Corporation, China's only producer of bombers, on the verge of bankruptcy.

In short, in 1998, there is no Chinese nuclear threat to India and no plan to create one.

All this is quite clear from a Chinese perspective -- while the 1962 war left India with deep psychic scars, most Chinese see it as a minor border skirmish, now nearly forgotten. Military officers now say they have not done contingency planning for a war with India for decades. If they ever had, it is unlikely nuclear weapons would have figured in, since nuclear weapons are of little use in border wars.