Signs are that Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic will be pressured to quit, or be bodily removed from office, although he has survived serious challenges in the past and could again do so. However, even if he goes chances are not great that democracy could come to Serbia. PNS commentator Eric Gordy, professor of sociology at Clark University in Massachusetts, has lived in Serbia, speaks the language and researched its cultural scene for over a decade.

Things are looking bad for Slobodan Milosevic. He has control over Serbia's media and still benefits from anti-Western sentiment -- but this may not be enough to keep him and his regime in power.

Opposition parties openly defy his ban on protest meetings. Serb refugees from Kosovo are living demonstrations of his failures. And the patriotic Serbian Orthodox Church is shocked enough by the evidence of human rights abuses against Albanians to preach about them.

Most ominous, the nationalist right, his most stalwart resource, is abandoning him. People are beginning to agree that Milosevic's days in power are numbered, though nobody will offer a time table.

But for the Serbian people -- and the world -- how the regime will end is more important than when. A violent end will probably mean more years of dictatorship and further decline of the region. A peaceful and democratic transfer of power could mean the beginning of stability in the Balkans.

Given the situation in Serbia since the bombing, I can see three possible scenarios for the end of the regime -- but only one, the least likely, seems as if it might lead to a stable democratic government.

(1) The Doberman scenario

The guards outside Argentina's presidential palace were called "Dobermans," because they so frequently turned on their masters. Will this happen to Milosevic?

His control over the police has been firm, secured by good pay and a cut from lucrative smuggling. But over the last decade police have vigorously recruited angry Serbian refugees from Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia. These displaced Serbs supported Milosevic, but will they continue to do so now that their political interests have been sacrificed?

Young police and army recruits are sensitive to the increasing evidence of atrocities committed by their officers and worry they could stain the institution permanently. Until now these feelings have mostly led to desertion, but they could become the seedbed of mutiny.

(2) The Technocrat scenario

In countries ruled by a single party, people generally join that party for one of three reasons. Politicals -- the smallest group -- join because they support the party and want to advance its programs. A larger group, gravy-trainers, are in for a cut from contracts, corruption or patronage. The largest group, technocrats, are in because they have to be to maintain a job or protect the jobs of their employees.

The politicals will only bolt when their frustration is unbearable, but even then they will lack credibility. Gravy-trainers might be moved to bolt if they see neighboring Kosovo and Montenegro receiving lucrative reconstruction aid -- but only if they think they are unlikely to get contracts.

The largest group is the weakest link. If the regime is impoverished and unstable, then the technocrats will see it cannot promise protection, and they will turn elsewhere.

(3) The Conscience scenario

The defection of the Orthodox Church from the nationalist coalition is a major event. This is the first time an institution with moral authority has decided to speak openly about the regime's responsibility for war crimes. If opposition leaders can use the shock produced by revelation of atrocities to start vigorous public debate, that could lead to a consensus that democratic change is necessary.

To do this religious and political leaders will have to persuade people that their patriotism and grievances were misused to justify actions that destroyed the country, demolished Serbia's reputation in the world, and eventually led to the defeat of the very causes they were fighting for. And they will have to do this in a way that does not allow the regime-controlled media to tar them with the brush of being unpatriotic if not outright treasonous.

There are a lot of ifs in this scenario. It requires the opposition to unify to the point where they look capable of taking power. It also requires people to turn away from a decade-long habit of nationalist thinking -- a tall order. There is also a possibility that none of these scenarios will develop. Milosevic still has a strong control network, and has used it successfully before. And despite his chronic lack of popular support, his opponents have never been able to generate enough support to challenge him seriously.

The Western powers could influence events to make a democratic outcome likely. Unfortunately they have a history of dropping the ball, and of saving Milosevic, intentionally or not, just when he is weakest.