Russia's troubles in Dagestan and Chechnya, highlighted in recent days by bombings in Moscow, are complex with experts offering widely different scenarios. The bottom line is that we are witnessing the end of an empire -- not the Soviet but the Russian empire. PNS commentator Thomas Goltz, author of "Azerbaijan Diary" (M.E. Sharpe, 1999) is currently working on a book on ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet Caucasus.

The recent paroxysm of violence in the Russian sub-republic of Dagestan bodes ill for all parties concerned -- the Russians, diverse Dagestani ethnic groups, the semi-stable governments in neighboring Georgia and particularly Azerbaijan, and the citizens of the battered, breakaway Republic of Chechnya/Ichkeria, the deep base of the Islamist fighters now engaging the Russian military.

Reports from the mountainous region are hazy. Both the Islamist guerrillas (so-called 'Wahabbites') loyal to Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev and the Russian government have attempted to put their own spin on developments, while keeping independent observers out. Each side makes what appear to be exaggerated claims about losses and atrocities, but it seems safe to say that hundreds have been killed.

Beyond that, nothing can be said with certainty. The recent bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow have been attributed to Islamic militants, but no one is sure. The Russians allege that Saudi financier Bin Laden is financing the Dagestani revolt, but they may merely be using that evocative name to suck in even greater U.S. aid.

The conspiriologists are having a field day, as are the post-Sovietologists and Russia-watchers, few (if any) of whom have spent any time in Dagestan or Chechnya. They offer conflicting interpretations.

Some suggest that the new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is working on building a "big hammer" to exterminate Basayev once and for all -- and then use the "Islamist Threat" argument to extend Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Other experts see a replay of the disastrous Chechen war, when underfed and underage Russian conscripts were thrown at mountain fortresses defended by battled-hardened and religiously motivated mujahideen. These commentators predict Russia will ultimately lose Dagestan and eventually the entire mainly Muslim, multi-ethnic North Caucasus -- which is, in fact, the stated goal of Shamil Basayev.

Much ink has been spilled on the Wahabbi phenomenon, ranging from the suggestion that it is a red herring created by Moscow to the contention that the appearance of this stern Saudi Arabian sect among the normally pious-but-pleasant Muslims of the Caucasus is part of a well-financed scheme hatched by western intelligence to create disunity.

But the most extraordinary development in the obscure mountain war is anti-Wahhabi (and thus, anti-Basayev/Chechen) volunteerism among Dagestani Muslims. And therein lies the greatest danger. Should Basayev and the truly fundamentalist fringe prevail against the Russian military, they will ineluctably turn from a war against the "infidel" to a war against the "munafiq" (hypocrites) -- those who not only declined to go along with Basayev's most recent revolt, but actively opposed it with their lives. And that is a conflict that will spread into other, moderately or nominally Muslim lands, chief among them Azerbaijan.

If Moscow succeeds in crushing the revolt in Dagestan, there is little doubt that a revived Russian military machine would start interfering elsewhere -- first in Chechnya itself, in revenge for Russia's humiliation and defeat, and then in the semi-stable neighboring republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Michael Reynolds, an American scholar, compares the current process with the slow but sure collapse of the Ottoman state at the end of the 19th Century. Despite a new constitution guaranteeing liberty for all subjects, including non-Muslims, and infusions of cash from abroad, nothing stopped the Ottomans' terminal decline. In that case, the ethno-national religious fundamentalism used to cut the "Turkish yoke" from the Balkan states was not Islam, but Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

The question Western policy makers and real friends of Russia should be asking is how to assist Moscow to gradually divest itself of provinces and regions it has for all intents and purposes already lost.

We are looking at the termination of an empire: not the Soviet, but the Russian one. We should do all that we can to make it as chaos-free as possible -- a steep task.