In Pakistan, Washington's views have always been decisive -- perhaps until this week. Now, argues Ras H. Siddiqui, post-coup thinking in Washington must include the view from Pakistan to ensure the region's stability. PNS correspondent Ras H. Siddiqui is the publisher of California-based Pakistan Link.

Pakistan's military takeover throws doubts upon Washington's traditional sway over Islamabad. Have the "Young Turks" taken over despite Washington's objections? Has the United States been paying attention to popular opinion there at all?

To those of Pakistani origin in the United States, news of the coup Oct. 13 was not much of a surprise because we were already astounded by news of the night before: that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had fired Gen. Pervez Musharraf, chief of the armed forces, and replaced him with Lt. Gen. Khwaja Ziauddin, head of intelligence. That was the real surprise because Pakistan's army chiefs are not the ones usually fired by elected heads of government. But we also knew that Ziauddin and the Prime Minister's brother had recently visited Washington, so we figured Washington gave its blessings to firing Musharraf.

But within hours it appeared that the tables had turned, and the elected Prime Minister was the one out of a job. Gen. Musharraf now calls himself "Chief Executive."

After 1958, when the army intervened to take control under General Ayub Khan, Pakistan became America's most "allied ally." It was a significant player in the U.S. anti-Communist crusade in Asia. The dictator General Ziaul Haq continued to be America's darling even after he overthrew Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1977) and had him executed (1979).

But in 1990 the Bush Administration changed this special relationship by stopping all military aid, even spare parts, under the country-specific Pressler Amendment, in order to discourage Pakistan from going nuclear. Pakistanis joke bitterly that for the American amendment to be applicable, the flag of the sanctioned country had to be green, with a white crescent moon and a star on it, and its language Urdu. One writer said after the demise of the Soviet Union -- an event helped by its defeat in Afghanistan -- the U.S. tossed Pakistan away like "a used lemon." During this summer's face-off with India over Kashmir, another writer looked at Washington's pro-India stand and called it a grim reminder of our "lemon status."

Nawaz Sharif had always projected himself as a "made in Pakistan" leader in contrast to his more talented rival, the made-in-the-West Benazir Bhutto. But on July 4 he signed a very unpopular agreement in Washington to withdraw Pakistani military support and personnel from the Kargil area in Kashmir. If Americans want to know why there are no widespread street demonstrations supporting Sharif, they might think about that July 4 meeting with President Clinton, and the agreement to protect the "sanctity" of the Line Of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. Pakistanis perceived their democratically-elected leadership as selling out over the one issue upon which Pakistanis overwhelmingly agree: that the LOC is unholy and that Kashmir is disputed territory, whose people have yet to decide which country to join -- a choice promised by the United Nations.

At home, Nawaz Sharif was not the perfect democrat. He should have done more to ensure the press was not intimidated, editors jailed. He forced out the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. And if he had only worked as hard on improving the Pakistani economy as he did on attempting to discredit Benazir Bhutto, he would have much more support today.

But it seems that the thinking about other issues -- nuclear capability and fundamentalism -- are most important in Washington. One of these issues remains unaffected: the Pakistani nuclear program has always been the domain of its armed forces, and thus this coup has little or no impact on it.

Fundamentalism on the other hand, grows in lawlessness and desperation in the region. The continuing anarchy in Afghanistan is an example. But it is amazing what good jobs and prospects of a better standard of living do to defeat the intentions of fascists. Osama Ben Ladin or the Taliban only come into the picture in Pakistan if the economy fails.

What should Washington be thinking now? It would be unwise to alienate Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The current scenario is the outcome of a power struggle in which the Prime Minister lost, to the surprise of no one in Pakistan. The U.S. should continue to call for an elected government, because coups should not be acceptable as a norm. But President Clinton should go to Pakistan as planned early next year, as well as to India and Bangladesh -- regional stability must be encouraged. And Pakistan still needs to be bailed out economically, not just by the approval of more loans but by the permanent retirement of some of its enormous debt.

So there is a place where perceptions in Washington and Pakistan might come together. Washington needs to finally do something about Kashmir. That is because the road to fundamentalism in Pakistan, which may have once gone through Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan with the active participation of the United States, today passes through the miserable lives of the Muslims in Indian occupied Kashmir.