Whatever was intended, President Clinton's recent visit to India and Pakistan seems to have left some bitter feelings behind. PNS commentator Sherry Rehman, writing from Pakistan, sees signs of a new tilt toward India in both the visit and what has followed. A longer version of this piece appears in the Lahore, Pakistan-based publication, The Nation.

LAHORE, PAKISTAN -- Bill Clinton's visit to South Asia demonstrates the low level of discourse about nuclear weapons in the region.

It was expected that Clinton would use the visit to promote, among other things, non-proliferation and reducing tensions in what he has called "the most dangerous place in the world."

With a nuclear state like India talking of "limited war" with Pakistan over Kashmir, and Pakistan's General Musharraf referring to "jihad," the situation merited attention and hopes were high, certainly in Pakistan, that some mediation might follow the visit.

Instead, judging from what has followed, Clinton's five-day visit to India and five-hour stay in Pakistan heralded an important shift in U.S. policy that could exacerbate relations on the subcontinent.

In New Delhi, after making all the right noises on peace, Clinton very clearly deferred to India, saying it must decide if its nuclear arsenal served the interests of peace.

After years of castigating India for its policy of unilateral multiple testing, the country's pugnacity is now apparently to be rewarded.

Other statements also contradicted stated U.S. priorities. For example, Washington clearly recognizes the importance of peace between India and Pakistan. So the flat announcement that the U.S. would not and could not mediate between the two -- despite the mammoth increase in the Indian defense budget, despite the 700,000 troops it has stationed in Kashmir -- must have disappointed policy-makers in Pakistan.

The U.S. stance reflects not just a concern for Indian sensibilities but resistance to a new architecture of peace in South Asia. Only the U.S. can reward or punish an increasingly trade-driven Indian economy to force it to the negotiating table without baggage from the past.

For Islamabad, standards are different, since Pakistan's economic dependency puts it in the position of having to send a Prime Minister to Washington and withdraw from conflict zones.

The Americans would explain that India cannot be coerced like its smaller neighbor. This is not untrue -- India has several times responded negatively to American efforts -- yet there is a hole in the heart of this line of reasoning. If India cannot be pushed around like Pakistan, then why must India be pampered and rewarded for disregarding every U.S. goal and UN resolution in the book? Why must "terrorism" be used only to define non-state forces in Kashmir and Afghanistan?

Washington explains its big chill toward Islamabad purely in terms of Pakistan's anti-democratic attitude, not as a preference for India. But if getting Osama bin Laden is critical, it would seem best to work closely with Pakistan.

Afghanistan, with its fallout of war, narcotics, gun-running and terrorism, is a hemorrhaging sore in Pakistan's side that any government will want to contain. But instead of offering real assistance in mopping up after its proxy war, Washington is acting like an impatient creditor who had nothing to do with the problem.

Finally, Clinton clearly assigned to Pakistan the responsibility for violence in Indian-held Kashmir, brushing aside the UN resolution that promises a plebiscite there. Clinton called the Line of Control a "boundary" so as to castigate Pakistan for violating the border at Kargil -- with no reference to the 12-year-long indigenous insurrection nor to Pakistan's appeals for UN observers and neutral media in the disputed territory.

While it is hard to deny most of the cruel realities that Clinton forced the military regime to look squarely in the face, the U.S. should realize that it is going to be difficult to work with a foreign policy roadmap that isolates Pakistan as the bully on the block.

India is clearly a nation that the U.S. wants to do business with in a big way. Non-proliferation, arms and missile reduction, etc. are like juggler's balls they expect to keep up in the air.

The model is China. Beijing was battered for human rights violations and anti-democratic practices, by officials who, straight-faced, debated the merits of according China Most Favored Nation status.

The message -- as long as business interests converge, all other priorities are marginal. India can safely imagine that economic power and the nuclear tests have given it status of the sort that American political culture not only values but celebrates.

Pakistan too may be driven to consider other perhaps more dangerous alternatives. Before that happens, it would be judicious for Washington to lean a little on India and at least reap some benefit from this presidential junket.

Private diplomacy can still yield a peace bonus. If there is no significant breakthough on the political front over the next few months, Clinton will be credited with creating new fault lines instead of closing old ones.