Camp David II is a key way station on a long road that yet has a long distance to go. Traveling this road are not only the living but the dead. Yaser Arafat is the leader of the Palestinians. But also traveling at his side is the spirit of another leader, the late president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad. Both sought peace with Israel yet their approaches were polar opposites. Faisal Tbeileh is an independent researcher on Middle East politics, currently residing in San Francisco. Palestinian born, Tbeileh has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Los Angeles. His e-mail address is faisaltb@yahoo.com.

Two men will play decisive roles in the implementation of the Camp David II accords in the weeks and months to come. One of them is alive, Yaser Arafat, chairman of the Palestinian Authority. The other is dead, Hafez al-Assad, the late president of Syria.

Both agreed that there was no choice but to make a peace with Israel that gives justice to the Palestinians and restores lost territory to the Syrians. But their ways of dealing with Israel were polar opposites. And though he is now gone Hafez al-Assad's methods still guide his successor, his son Bashar. And his spirit remains close to Yaser Arafat.

The Israeli negotiating strategy with both Assad and Arafat was to play a see-saw game of pressure and concession. The Israelis believed agreement with the PLO would increase the international isolation of the Syrian regime and weaken Asad's claim that he was championing the Palestinian cause. If the Palestinians were ready to accept Israel, why not the Syrians?

On the other hand the Israelis used press leaks proclaiming immanent agreement between Syria and Israel to feed Arafat's insecurity about being ignored. They thought that would pressure him into making substantial concessions during final Israeli-Palestinian status talks.

This strategy did not work with Assad. He did not let Israel's unpredictable and turbulent politics cloud his judgment, as had occurred with Arafat. The Israelis frequently induced Arafat to make quick decisions by warning him of what might happen if the Labor Party lost the election. Assad understood that lasting peace is made between states, regardless of which party holds power. Leaders might not live long enough to implement peace, as evidenced by the assassinations of Egypt's Sadat and Israel's Rabin.

Assad watched closely how the Israelis behaved after signing the treaties with Egypt and the Palestinians. They dragged their feet on carrying out those agreements. Israel's supporters in the United States, particularly in Congress, never moderated their opposition to positive American overtures toward the people of the region, even after their support of American policy during the Gulf war against Iraq. That contributed to Assad's extreme caution and mistrust of Israeli intentions.

As a result Assad assumed a tenacious negotiating style and unending patience. He kept insisting that Israel must declare its intention to withdraw from every last square inch of the Golan Heights as the precondition for serious negotiations regarding normalization of relations between the two countries.

Hafez al-Assad again and again thwarted Israel's negotiating strategy. When he died and his son Bashar Assad took over, Israelis and Americans at first hoped that Bashar might be willing to talk and compromise. But now the policy makers concede that peace with Syria will have to wait. The first priority of the youthful and inexperienced Bashar Assad is consolidating his power.

If Assad's stance was to draw back and let the Israelis and Americans come to him Arafat's was the opposite. He again and again came forward towards them. He believes that the Israelis, despite their unwillingness to admit it, see him as their best bet for ending the conflict with the Palestinians. His strategy is that accommodation has the best chance of gaining concessions. He may be right in this but for a reason he himself and others cannot talk about, namely his own mortality.

It is generally known in the region that Arafat desperately wants to become the first president of an independent Palestine. Arafat and the council of the Palestinian Authority have already called for declaring a Palestinian state this coming fall. And the American presidential elections are looming closer and closer. This could make Prime Minister Barak take a more conciliatory attitude towards Arafat. And at Camp David President Clinton comes across as even more conciliatory.

Both resistance and accommodation have marked the Palestinian struggle since 1948 when the State of Israel was proclaimed. The spirit of Hafez al-Assad carries on the resistance. Yet since the June 1967 war the demarcation lines between Israelis and Syrians along the Golan Heights have been peaceful. By contrast the Palestinian territories under Israeli occupation have seen much strife even after Yaser Arafat accepted accommodation as his strategy.

The accords agreed to at Camp David II will have their test in the weeks and months that follow. There will be accommodation but it would be folly to assume that the resistance will vanish.