By Franz Schurmann

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Peace accords will be signed between Israel and Syria and Israel will withdraw from southern Lebanon before or during July 2000

Explanation: In the "Special Report" attached to Prediction #45 I said that during this year 2000 I would try out some different ways of making predictions. This is the first of such try-outs.

Since early last year 1999 I have been predicting peace accords between Israel and the Arab states in question: Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Below I make use of my translation of an op-ed piece by Kareem Baqraduni, a frequent commentator for the As-Sharq Al-Ausat, probably the most influential of the Arabic-language international papers. He also believes, current signs to the contrary, that peace accords will be signed this summer.

My approach to peace accords prediction has been mostly based on reading of the trends in "big picture" international relations. Baqraduni makes his prediction on the basis of the situation in the countries concerned, mainly Israel. He does not discuss the Hizbollah or Lebanon in general or Syria. His main conclusion is that peace now depends on Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Hizbollah leaders. He believes that both sides now realize there is no alternative to ending the war in southern Lebanon.

Because of deteriorating US-Russian relations I am now not as optimistic on peace in the Middle East as I was last year. Though I wish Baqraduni had said something about Syria and the Hizbollah I think he does believe that both now too want peace. So his op-ed piece has restored a bit of my earlier optimism. The key sentence reflecting his own optimism is the very last one in his piece: "It may sound as if we are on the brink of a large-scale military operation but in fact we are moving towards a large-scale peaceful settlement."

• Basis for the Prediction:
  

  "Lebanon on the Brink of Negotiations"

  Kareem Baqraduni (from As-Sharq Al-Ausat, February 5, 2000)

  Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak is using Hizbollah's successful operations in southern Lebanon to move towards withdrawal from southern Lebanon this coming July. And with that also will come a deal with Syria and victory over the Israeli opposition to the agreements.

  When a high ranking commander of the pro-Israeli South Lebanon Army, Akl Hashem, was killed Barak's first reaction was uncertainty. Akl Hashem was the strongman of the SLA. Then came the killing of three Israeli soldiers on top of the suspension of talks with Syria followed by Israeli air strikes against Lebanon's infrastructure.

  But suddenly Barak's language took a different tone. He characterized Hizbollah's military operations against the Israeli army and the SLA as "tours-de-force that now call for it to lay down its arms."

  Yet at the same time he blamed Hizbollah for the suspension of peace talks with Syria. He said their prime aim was to destroy the SLA. That would force Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon with or without an agreement.

  If the cost of staying in Lebanon for Israel is greater than pulling out then two things could happen. One would create a pretext for Barak to end the talks with Syria. But it also could be the path leading to agreement with both Lebanon and Syria. Which option it will be depends on Barak and Hizbollah.

  The US and Syria are carefully watching Israel and Hizbollah. Both are relieved that Hizbollah accepts the accords of April 1996 and that Barak is committed to an agreement with Syria to precede Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. But these commitments came before two big events: one caused by Hizbollah was the killing of Akl Hashem and three Israeli soldiers and the other caused by Israel was its redrawing of the boundary lines of the SLA's domain and its revenge bombing of several Lebanese locations.

  From a political perspective I don't believe Lebanon faces wider Israeli military operations. Some Israeli voices call for cooling down the revenge while others call for postponing the withdrawal from Lebanon. I believe many Israelis now believe there is no military solution in Lebanon and there willbe no security unless an understanding is reached with Syria.

  From a military perspective one could say that costs of large-scale military operations would be not so great as to deter Israel. But I don't believe that Ehud Barak would be so naive as to commit his military forces to such an operation just because the chieftain of a militia allied with Israel was assassinated and some three or four Israeli soldiers were killed in a military operation.

  Ehud Barak is no less shrewd than his predecessor Benyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu did not rush to launch military operations when one of the top Israeli leaders in southern Lebanon, General Ariz Greenstein, was killed last March.

  The defense minister of that time, the hawkish Moshe Arens, was still in the government when the Greenstein killing happened. But Netanyahu waited until he had only one more week left in his government to launch retaliation. "Operation Anger" did not aim at Hizbollah or the Lebanese Army but struck at infrastructural targets like power lines and bridges. Netanyahu timed the operation for the transition period of the government. That meant neither Netanyahu nor his successor Barak could be held responsible.

  What Netanyahu wouldn't do to avenge the killing of a top Israeli general Barak also won't do to avenge a top leader of the SLA allied with Israel. Since Akel Hashem was an important figure that puts Barak on the spot. He could be charged with disloyalty to the army and to Jews in general, creating anger among people and the opposition.

  Prevailing Arab opinion holds that Israel can carry out large-scale military operations whenever it wants to. But the reality as history shows is that Israel has always carefully planned its military operations to "get a good deal." It wants to make certain it has American support and international society on its side, especially American public opinion. It wants them to believe Israel's aims are justified and that its resort to arms is only taken when it sees no other solution.

  It's not enough for Israeli military planners to launch an operation only because it is taking losses in its ranks and that Israelis are subject to attack in northern Israel. It is not that simple. Israel only resorts to large-scale military operations when it sees that its goals are attainable and that their political aims are clearly understood. And especially the political and military goals must accord with each other. And nothing is so important as the balance sheet of gains and losses.

  In 1978 the goal was clear from the name given the move: "Operation Litani." It involved creating a security belt that would defend the settlers in northern Israel. The idea was to assure the safety of the settlers and convince them to stay.

  The goal in 1982 of Operation "Peace in Galilee was to expel the Palestinians from Lebanon, conclude a peace agreement with the Lebanese government and put an end to what Israel called "international terrorism."

  In 1993 the goal of "Operation Settling of Accounts" was linked to the Oslo accords. It put pressure on Lebanon and Syria to rein in their Palestinians. And at a minimum it sought to separate Lebanon from Syria and get them to make separate peace agreements with Israel.

  In 1996 the aim of Operation "Grapes of Wrath" was to keep Shimon Peres in power by helping him in the elections. This was done to keep the Oslo peace process going and preventing Netanyahu, who was seen as a menace to the peace process, from coming to power.

  In 1999 came revenge operations mostly with Netanyahu's imprint. He carried them out during the transition period between the Netanyahu and the Barak governments. He wanted a reckoning with Lebanon after all the troubles he had with it. Those raids were bad for Israel's image. They were of benefit to Barak because he gained the image of being a "good Israeli."

  Now in 2000 Israel stands at the beginning of a new era of strife in the Middle East. But it is getting ready for the withdrawal from Lebanon this coming July with a new operation: "Horizon for Galilee." This name has a peaceful and not a hostile ring to it. It implies ending an occupation and not inaugurating one.

  The bottom line is that Ehud Barak is not going to order a large-scale military operation against Lebanon that could detract from the objectives of this coming July. It may sound as if we are on the brink of a large-scale military operation but in fact we are moving towards a large-scale peaceful settlement.